

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9923

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2919

USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 2129

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD IN MAY 2 NAC
ON " US APPROACH TO MBFR"

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD
IN NAC ON MAY 2 TO INTRODUCE " US APPROACH TO MBFR."

BEGIN TEXT:

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MR. CHAIRMAN, ON APRIL 30 I CIRCULATED TO YOU AND TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE COUNCIL COPIES OF A PAPER AND SUPPORTING ANNEXES SETTING
FORTH US VIEWS ON A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE
PROSPECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.

THE US PAPER IS PUT FORWARD AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOINT TASK OF ALLIED PREPARATION FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IT DESCRIBES APPROACHES THAT THE US TENTATIVELY WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF OUTCOMES FROM MBFR. OUR FINAL PREFERENCES AS TO OUTCOMES WILL ONLY BE DETERMINED AFTER HAVING THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES. THE PAPER CONTAINS A COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF US VIEWS ON THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL MBFR ISSUES. NATURALLY, THERE ARE ADDITIONAL DETAILED QUESTIONS AND SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE COURSE OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON MBFR.

WE ARE OFFERING OUR VIEWS, AND WE WILL WISH TO RECEIVE YOUR COMMENTS AND LEARN YOUR VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF MBFR. WE SEE THIS AS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN ALLIED PREPARATIONS FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THROUGH THESE CONSULTATIONS WE SEEK TO WORK TOWARD A COMMON VIEW OF WHAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK IN MBFR.

ALLIED VIEWS ON PROCEDURAL STEPS AS WE PREPARE FOR THE JUNE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS OF MBFR ARE ALSO OF INTEREST, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT A DIALOGUE IN THE COUNCIL ON THE UNDERLYING SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF OUR INITIAL EFFORTS. ONCE WHAT THE ALLIES AS A WHOLE FEEL WE SHOULD BE SEEKING HAS BECOME CLEAR, THE COUNCIL CAN MORE EASILY ADDRESS PROCEDURAL AND TACTICAL MATTERS. THUS THIS PAPER DOES NOT ADDRESS SUCH MATTERS AS WHAT THE ALLIES MIGHT PROPOSE AT THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FALL OR HOW THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

THE OVERRIDING CONCERN OF THE ALLIANCE IS HOW TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE FACE OF RISING PUBLIC PRESSURE TO DECREASE THE BURDENS OF DEFENSE DURING A PERIOD OF DETENTE, AND THE RECENT EMERGENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. WE BELIEVE OUR NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE REMAINS SOUND.

SUCCESS IN MBFR WOULD PRESENT US WITH THE TASK OF ENSURING THAT RESIDUAL FORCES OF NATO REPRESENT AN EFFICIENT AND RATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE THAT IS CREDIBLE IN OUR EYES AND THOSE OF OUR POTENTIAL
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ADVERSARIES.

IT IS THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THAT NATO MUST MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE ITS CAPABILITY FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. MOREOVER, THE US RECOGNIZES THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF US FORCES IN THIS EFFORT.

AS STATED IN THE PAPER, THE US BELIEVES THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR PREPARATION FOR MBFR MUST BE A FRESH COMMITMENT FROM OUR ALLIES TO MAKE THE NECESSARY EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES AND DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS TOWARD ENHANCING THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF ALLIED GENERAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED, WE IN TURN WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL US TROOP COMMITMENT AND IMPROVE US

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF NATO. THE US WILL PROVIDE SOME ELABORATION OF ITS THINKING ON SPECIFIC FORCE IMPROVEMENT AREAS AT THE MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS IN JUNE.

AS IS CLEAR, THE US APPROACH TO MBFR IS BASED ON CONSIDERATIONS OF ALLIANCE MILITARY SECURITY. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY PRUDENT CRITERION FOR JUDGING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS IS THEIR IMPACT UPON THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

IF MBFR IS NOT GEARED TO REAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, ANY LEVEL OF REDUCTION MIGHT BE ARGUED, BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO STANDARD FOR JUSTIFYING ANY GIVEN LEVEL OF ALLIED FORCES.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE US VIEWS MBFR IN THE SHORT RUN AS HAVING LIMITED OBJECTIVES. IF OUR INITIAL STEPS ARE SATISFACTORY, WE CAN AT THAT POINT CONSIDER WHETHER MBFR COULD LEAD TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN EAST- WEST RELATIONSHIPS.

IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT OF MBFR SHOULD BE CONFINED TO CENTRAL EUROPE. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO AVOID PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES TO MBFR WHICH WOULD THREATEN TO EXPAND THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCUS OF CONSIDERATION FOR MBFR.

ON THE BASIS OF ANALYSIS THUS FAR, THE US BELIEVES THAT ALLIED REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE OF LIMITED SIZE, SO AS NOT TO IMPAIR NATO'S ABILITY TO FULFILL ITS AGREED STRATEGY. WE NOW BELIEVE THE LIMIT ON ALLIED MANPOWER REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SET AT TEN PERCENT.

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THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE CENTRAL REGION OF NATO IS PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE MAXIMUM REDUCTION OF THESE FORCES UNDER THE ABOVE RESTRICTION OF LIMITED ALLIED REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE OUR BASIC WESTERN OBJECTIVE. REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN STATIONED FORCES WILL CLEARLY BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN SUCH SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

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AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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LIMDIS

BASED ON OUR ANALYSIS, WE DO NOT FAVOR REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES, PARTICULARLY AT AN EARLY STAGE, BECAUSE SUCH REDUCTIONS NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE DISARMAMENT AND BECAUSE THE REDUCTIONS OF NON- SOVIET PACT FORCES WOULD GENERALLY NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE ALLIED REDUCTIONS MADE. OUR VIEWS ARE, HOWEVER, NOT CLOSED, AND DEPENDING UPON THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES, REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES MIGHT BE ENVISAGED AT A LATER STAGE.

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AGREEMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN MBFR WILL ULTIMATELY FALL UPON INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AS PART OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY, THE US VIEWS CLOSE COORDINATION ON MBFR AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ALLIED COHESION AS ESSENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THERE IS NO PRECEDENT OR MODEL FOR A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION ON A SENSITIVE SECURITY ISSUE LIKE MBFR, BUT I BELIEVE
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THAT THE ALLIED EXPERIENCE GAINED IN THE NAC AND IN VIENNA WILL STAND US IN GOOD STEAD AS WE PLAN FOR THE ALL NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER SOME MODIFICATIONS TO OUR EXISTING CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, THE US HAS NO BLUEPRINTS FOR CHANGES NOR IS IT CERTAIN THAT ANY ARE NEEDED.

WITH THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND, LET ME TURN TO THE SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO MBFR THAT WE ARE PUTTING FORWARD AS POTENTIALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES. THE THREE DISTINCT REDUCTION APPROACHES ARE:

- 1). THE PHASED COMMON CEILING APPROACH. PHASED COMMON CEILING REDUCTIONS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES;
- 2). THE PERCENTAGE PARITY APPROACH. ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCE LEVELS THROUGH ONE- SIXTH REDUCTIONS IN US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES; AND,
- 3). THE MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH. MIXED PACKAGE REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE FORCE ELEMENTS.

I WILL COMMENT ON EACH OF THESE APPROACHES BRIEFLY.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PHASED COMMON CEILING APPROACH

THE FIRST APPROACH WOULD HAVE SEPARATE REDUCTION PHASES, FIRST OF STATIONED FORCES AND THEN OF INDIGENOUS FORCES. IN EACH PHASE NATO WOULD COME DOWN IN THE APPROPRIATE GROUND MANPOWER LEVEL BY TEN PERCENT AND THE PACT WOULD REDUCE ITS MANPOWER TO AN EQUAL LEVEL WITH NATO.

THE FIRST REDUCTION PHASE WOULD INVOLVE STATIONED FORCES ONLY.

-- FOR NATO IT WOULD CONSIST OF WITHDRAWAL OF 34,000 ALLIED STATIONED FORCES IN WEST GERMANY AND THE BENELUX. THE ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF SUCH A CUT WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

-- PACT STATIONED FORCES, WHICH ARE EXCLUSIVELY SOVIET FORCES, WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED BY 83,000 IN THE CENTER REGION.

UNLESS THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED, VARIOUS CONSTRAINT
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MEASURES WOULD ACCOMPANY THE REDUCTIONS OF STATIONED FORCES.

THE SECOND REDUCTION PHASE WOULD INVOLVE INDIGENOUS NATO AND PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA THE FOLLOWING WAY:

-- FOR NATO, A TOTAL REDUCTION OF 46,000 FRG, BELGIAN, AND NETHERLANDS GROUND PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED;

-- THE PACT WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE A TOTAL OF 29,000 EAST GERMAN, POLISH, AND CZECH GROUND FORCES.

THE INDIGENOUS REDUCTIONS IN THIS APPROACH ARE TEN PERCENT. IT IS OUR PRESENT BELIEF THAT THIS IS THE TOLERABLE LIMIT FOR INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS REGARDLESS OF THE STAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THEY MAY BE ADDRESSED.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PHASED COMMON CEILING APPROACH

THE PHASED APPROACH IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT MBFR WOULD BE A LONG- TERM PROCESS EVENTUALLY INVOLVING REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THERE ARE BOTH BENEFITS AND RISKS IN SUCH A COURSE.

THE BENEFITS INCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE WEST MAY BE ABLE TO USE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO HELP AFFECT THE PACE AND CONTENT OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. IT WOULD BE A COMPLEX PROCESS INVOLVING SUCH MATTERS AS THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES, THEIR DISPOSITION AND TYPES OF DEPLOYMENTS.

THERE ARE ALSO RISKS TO THE PHASED APPROACH. FIRST, OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT REDUCING INDIGENOUS FORCES IS DISADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO. WE BASICALLY END UP TRADING REDUCTIONS IN MORE CAPABLE ALLIED FORCES FOR LESS CAPABLE INDIGENOUS PACT FORCES.

SECOND, WE OPEN UP ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS TO EXTENSIVE SOVIET INTERFERENCE. INDEED, THE OPEN- ENDED ASPECTS OF THE PHASED APPROACH MAY LEND ITSELF TO EXPLOITATION BY THE SOVIET UNION TO PURSUE ITS OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO " DISMANTLE" NATO.

THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST REDUCTION PHASE WOULD BE A DISPROPORTIONATE REDUCTION IN SOVIET FORCES. SUBSEQUENTLY, THIS APPROACH
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WOULD REQUIRE DISPROPORTIONATE INDIGENOUS ALLIED REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD PRESS FOR TIGHT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS REDUCTION PHASES.

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LIMDIS

DESCRIPTION OF THE PERCENTAGE PARITY APPROACH

THE SECOND APPROACH WOULD CALL FOR REDUCTIONS BY ONE- SIXTH OF US- SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO A US CUT OF 32,000 AND A 65,000 MAN SOVIET REDUCTION. THIS IS LESS THAN A TEN PERCENT CUT IN NATO STATIONED FORCES AND LESS THAN FOUR PERCENT CUT IN TOTAL NATO FORCES IN THE AREA. OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT SUCH A REDUCTION COULD BE MADE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WOULD NOT RESULT IN DISADVANTAGEOUS DEGRADATION OF NATO' S MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PERCENTAGE PARITY APPROACH

THE SECOND APPROACH IS CONCEPTUALLY A ONE- SHOT AFFAIR, ALTHOUGH
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IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN PHASES. IT WOULD RESULT IN OVERALL NATO- PACT GROUND FORCE PARITY.

THIS APPROACH HAS THE OBVIOUS NEGOTIATING ADVANTAGE OF EQUALITY OF TREATMENT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES ... BOTH WOULD BE REDUCED BY ONE- SIXTH ... WHILE THE ACTUAL REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE TWICE THE SIZE OF US CUTS. IT WOULD ALSO LEAVE THE INTEGRITY OF OTHER ALLIED STATIONED FORCES INTACT. REDUCTIONS AT A LATER POINT OF OTHER FORCES ARE NOT EXCLUDED, AND THE RATIONALE OF OVERALL NATO AND PACT GROUND MANPOWER PARITY WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH

THE MIXED PACKAGE ILLUSTRATION HAS THE FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS:

-- ON THE NATO SIDE, ONE OF THREE US PERSHNG BATTALIONS (37 LAUNCHERS), THREE SQUADRONS OF 18 F-4 AIRCRAFT (54 TOTAL AIRCRAFT), 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND SEVERAL THOUSAND US PERSONNEL DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN.

-- THE SOVIETS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW ONE OF THEIR TWO 5 DIVISION TANK ARMIES IN THE GDR. EACH TANK ARMY COMPRISES 60,000 GROUND PERSONNEL AND OVER 1,500 TANKS.

THE RESULTING LEVELS OF NATO AND PACT STATIONED GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD BE 337,000 AND 330,000 RESPECTIVELY, SO THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN STATIONED GROUND FORCE LEVELS WOULD BE ACHIEVED. ONLY A FEW THOUSAND US PERSONNEL WOULD NECESSARILY BE WITHDRAWN UNDER THIS APPROACH.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH

THE THIRD OR MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH CONTAINS NUCLEAR FORCE ELEMENTS AND THUS RAISES THE POLICY ISSUES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WHETHER OR NOT WE RAISE THE TOPIC OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WITHIN NATO, IT IS LIKELY TO BE RAISED BY THE SOVIETS. SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS AT AN EARLY STAGE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES PREPARE THEMSELVES BY MEANS OF A CONCRETE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

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CONCEPTUALLY, THE OPTION ILLUSTRATED FORCUSES ON THE ASPECT OF SOVIET FORCES MOST THREATENING TO NATO AND OFFERS REDUCTION IN THOSE US FORCES WHICH, IN THE PAST, HAVE BEEN OF EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE PACT. IF IT COULD BE ACHIEVED IT WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE PEACEPEACETIME BALANCE OF FORCES ALONG THE CENTRAL FRONT. REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, IT MUST BE REGARDED IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM THE OTHER OPTIONS, BECAUSE BY ITSELF IT WOULD NOT MEET EXISTING PRESSURES FOR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. THUS WE COULD CONSIDER THIS OPTION AS SOMETHING TO BE ADDED TO THE OTHER OPTIONS.

AT THIS POINT, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME GENERAL REMARKS RELATING TO FORCE REDUCTIONS. AS YOU MAY HAVE NOTED IN ANNEX B THE APPENDIX ON MILITARY ANALYSIS, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES TO DEVELOP SPECIFIC ILLUSTRATIVE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES. THESE REDUCTIONS ARE NOT MORE THAN HYPOTHETICAL MODELS, BUT THIS RAISES A CRITICAL POINT FROM OUR PREVIOUS MBFR PAPERS THAT I WANT TO REEMPHASIZE. NAMELY, THE SPECIFIC FORM IN WHICH A REDUCTION WOULD BE TAKEN HAS GREAT IMPACT ON THE POTENTIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF A CUT OF ANY GIVEN SIZE.

IDENTIFYING THE BEST METHOD OF MAKING REDUCTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE THE PROPORTION OF COMBAT TO SUPPORT TROOPS, WILL REQUIRE FURTHER EXAMINATION, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT NATO WILL WISH TO PROTECT IMMEDIATE COMBAT CAPABILITY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. AN ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOME ADDITIONAL SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD FACILITATE US REDUCTIONS IN THE SUPPORT AREA RATHER THAN IN COMBAT FORCES.

FINALLY, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO INSURE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT FREE TO CIRCUMVENT OR UNDERMINE THE PROVISIONS OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH A BUILDUP IN HUNGARY. WE WILL JOIN FULLY IN AN ALLIED EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE PROVISIONS DESIGNED TO AVOID THIS POSSIBILITY.

THREE OTHER ASPECTS OF MBFR MERIT COMMENT:

- FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT;
 - POSSIBLE PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS; AND,
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- VERIFICATION MEASURES.

FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT. AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW THE US HAS REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR A FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS. THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF ADVERSE IMPACT ON NATO'S FLEXIBILITY, THE MARGINAL BENEFITS OF ANY RESULTS LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED, AND THE UNDESIRABILITY OF A DEADLOCK OVER SUCH AN ISSUE COMBINE TO MAKE US VERY NEGATIVE ON THIS POTENTIAL ELEMENT OF MBFR.

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CONSTRAINTS. IN CONTRAST TO OUR STANCE ON FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT, WE DO PROPOSE TO SEEK FOUR PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINT MEASURES. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO AGREE TO MAKE ACCEPTANCE OF THESE CONSTRAINTS A PRE- CONDITION TO ANY NEGOTIATION ON REDUCTIONS.

HOWEVER, AT A MINIMUM, IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTRAINTS WOULD HAVE TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS. AS YOU HAVE PERHAPS NOTICED, THESE ARE SIMILAR TO THE MEASURES SOUGHT IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES IN CSCE, NAMELY:

- PRE- ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF STATIONED FORCES INTO THE AREA;
- PRE- ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES; AND,

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-- EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES.

-- IN ADDITION, LIMITS MIGHT BE SOUGHT ON THE SIZE, LOCATION, NUMBER, AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES.

WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH MBFR AND CSCE CONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST THREE MEASURES IS APPROPRIATE, BECAUSE WE DO NOT FEEL THE GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS OF MBFR SHOULD SERVE TO CONFINE THE APPLICABILITY OF CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES. SEEKING SUCH CONSTRAINTS EARLY IN MBFR IS IMPORTANT AND THESE MEASURES MAY BE MORE DEMANDING IN TERMS OF THE DETAILS INVOLVED THAN THOSE WITHIN THE CSCE CONTEXT.

WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS, THE MEASURES ARE LISTED WITH ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE DETAILS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THIS AREA WILL REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF FURTHER STUDY, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO WHAT NATO CAN ACCEPT. IT IS EASY TO DEVELOP CONSTRAINTS AIMED SOLELY AT THE OTHER SIDE, BUT TO KEEP A REALISTIC BASIS FOR MBFR, WE MUST ASSUME THAT TO BE ACCEPTED, CONSTRAINT MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO APPLIED IN A SYMMETRICAL FASHION.

VERIFICATION MEASURES. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, AMONG WHICH AGREEMENT ON NON- INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IS PERHAPS THE MOST ESSENTIAL. THE ALLIES MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ANY VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TO NATO, SINCE WE MUST ASSUME THAT, AS WITH CONSTRAINTS, ANY NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL BE APPLIED SYMMETRICALLY. WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE SPECIFICS OF SUCH PROVISIONS WILL NECESSARILY DEPEND UPON THE SPECIFICS OF EVENTUAL REDUCTIONS AGREEMENTS.

THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WITH THE ALLIES THE POSSIBILITY OF PROPOSING AT AN EARLY POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO OTHERNEGOTIATED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, IN ADDITION TO NON- INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

WE BELIEVE THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL FOR MBFR WHICH WOULD DEPEND CRITICALLY ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. WE MUST
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BE PREPARED TO RELY ON NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, ACCOMPANIED BY AGREEMENT WITH THE WARSAW PACT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO CITE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES SHOULD GUIDE THE DETAILED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREFERRED ALLIED POSITION WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSIDERATION PRIOR TO THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS.

1. THE ALLIED POSITION ON MBFR SHOULD BE AIMED AT AN OUTCOME THAT WILL MAINTAIN AND IF POSSIBLE ENHANCE THE MILITARY SECURITY POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT BY " UNDIMINISHED SECURITY".

2. TO DO SO THE ALLIED APPROACH SHOULD BE AIMED AT REDUCING THE ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE FAVORING THE WARSAW PACT-- THIS INCLUDES THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND OFFENSIVE ORIENTATION OF PACT FORCES AND MITIGATION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES OF THE SOVIET UNION IN REINFORCEMENT. THUS, THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR SHOULD INCLUDE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND THE REDUCTION OF ELEMENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT POSTURE THREATENING TO NATO SECURITY. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE ALLIED APPROACH TO INSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY MBRFR AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED.

3. ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR MBFR SHOULD AT LEAST INITIALLY FOCUS ON STATIONED FORCE REDUCTIONS, SINCE THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT CONFRONTATION IS SUCH THAT REDUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE CENTER REGION MUST BE A PRIMARY AIM AND CANNOT BE OBTAINED WITHOUT REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN STATIONED FORCES.

4. REDUCTIONS N THE ALLIED SIDE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO APPROXI- MATELY TEN PERCENT IN TOTAL STATIONED AND TOTAL INDIGENOUS MANPOWER. MBFR MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE OF SUCH SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE AS TO IMPAIR THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MILITARY STEPS TO FULFILL NATO STRATEGY: FORWARD DEFENSE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

5. THE ALLIED POSITION SHOULD INCLUDE AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE APPROPRIATE PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. HOWEVER, THIS SHOULD NOT BE A PRE- CONDITION TO THE NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS. SUCH CONSTRAINTS
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SHOULD ACCOMPANY ANY INITIAL REDUCTIONS AND PRECEDE ANY INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE PURPOSE OF ANY CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN VERIFICATION AND STRATEGIC WARNING AND TO DEMONSTRATE PACT WILLINGNESS TO FOREGO THE USE OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

6. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED IN PHASES. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE PROPOSED PHASES SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT FOR MINISTERS' CONSIDERATIO. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES MUST BE PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD CONCRETE PROPOSAL INCLUDING REDUCTIONS IN THE FALL AND THE OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REQUIREMENT TO PROCEED WITH FLEXIBILITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9927

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2923

USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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LIMDIS

7. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES AND TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO ENHANCE ALLIANCE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES DURING THE MBFR PROCESS. THE APPROPRIATE BODIES OF THE NORTHER ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR SUCH IMPROVEMENTS TO ACCOMPANY OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

I HAVE COVERED THE ESSENTIAL POINTS IN " THE U. S. APPROACH TO MBFR". IN PROVIDING THE U. S. THINKING AND VIEWS ON VARIOUS MBFR, ISSUES, WE HAVE TWO AIMS:

-- TO FACILITATE CONSIDERATION OF MBFR OUTCOMES AT THE UPCOMING MINISTERIAL MEETINGS; AND,

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-- TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT DURING THE SUMMAR OF AN ALLIANCE POSITION FOR THE PROSPECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FALL.

AS WE DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT WE SHOULD DEVELOP PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD HELP TO GIVE DIRECTION TO THE DETAILED WORK WE WILL NEED TO DO IN PREPARING PAPERS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE COUNCIL FINDS THE U. S. PAPER AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR BEGINNING THIS UNDERTAKING, WE BELIEVE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH I LISTED ABOVE MIGHT BE A STARTING POINT.

IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IT MAY IN ADDITION BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TOWARDS A CONSENSUS ON ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE OPTIONS DESCRIBED OR SUCH OTHER OPTION AS MAY BE PROPOSED.

AS DISCUSSIONS PROCEED HERE IN THE COUNCIL, I WANT TO STRESS AGAIN THE SENSITIVITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.

INITIALLY WE WILL BE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE OUTCOMES ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE, NOT OPENING POSITIONS. UNLIKE INITIAL OPENING POSITION, WHICH ARE TACTICAL AND WHICH WILL BE KNOWN TO THE OTHER SIDE AT SOME POINT ANYWAY, KNOWLEDGE BY THE WARSAW PACT OF WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES WOULD REDUCE OUR FLEXIBILITY DRAMATICALLY IN NEGOTIATIONS IN A MOST DANGEROUS WAY. THIS IS A NEW CHAPTER FOR THE COUNCIL AND ONE WHICH I BELIEVE REQUIRES SPECIAL CARE AND SENSITIVITY.

WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONTINUE THIS DISCUSSION NEXT WEEK OR AT THE CONVENIENCE OF THE COUNCIL. IF DESIRED, WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE U. S. EXPERTS TO MEET HERE WITH EXPERTS FROM ALLIED CAPITALS LATER THIS MONTH.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MBFR IS AGREED BY ALL TO BE A COMPLEX SUBJECT MATTER. THE COMING PERIOD WILL BE ONE OF EDUCATION FOR US ALL AS WELL AS FOR OUR STAFFS AND THOSE IN NATIONAL CAPITALS. IT WILL TAKE PATIENCE AND POSSIBLY CONSIDERABLE EFFORT AND UNDERSTANDING TO ACHIEVE A COMMON ALLIED POSITION. IF WE RECOGNIZE THIS AT THE OUTSET I BELIEVE WE CAN AVOID THE FRUSTRATIONS THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE OCCUR HERE OR IN CAPITALS.

ONE THOUGHT I HAVE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBMITTING QUESTIONS
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IN WRITING AT OR BETWEEN MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL, SO THAT WRITTEN ANSWERS CAN BE PREPARED CAREFULLY AND TRANSMITTED AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, RATHER THAN SIMPLY TO THE ORIGINATOR OF THE QUESTION. IF THIS WOULD BE USEFUL, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ATTEMPT TO WORK WITH THE COUNCIL TO COORDINATE SUCH PROCEDURE.

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

END TEXT.
RUMSFELD

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